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Multiple Equilibria in a Simple Model 
of Search with Entry 
Sugato Dasgupta* 
Diamond (1971) analyzed a goods market wherein identical 
buyers with unitary demand searched sequentially over identical 
monopolistically competitive firms. The equilibrium market price 
was shown to be the monopoly price. Suppose, now, that to 
participate in a "Diamond-market," prospective buyers are 
charged a small but positive entry fee. Since the market price 
fully extracts consumer surplus from entering buyers. no one 
finds it worthwhile to pay this entry fee. To study the non-trivial 
implications of consumer entry, I modify the Diamond-model 
slightly. The modified model displays two interesting features: 
buyers with strictly positive entry fees enter the goods market. 
and the goods market generates multiple equilibrium prices. 
Keywords: Search, Market entry, Multiple equilibria 
JEL Classfiation: L11, L13 
I. Introduction 
In a seminal paper, Diamond (1971) analyzed a goods market 
with the following features: identical prospective buyers with 
unitary demand and gross valuation, v, searched sequentially, a t  a 
fixed cost per observation, over identical monopolistically competi- 
tive firms. A remarkable result was established: regardless of the 
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magnitude of the search cost, the equilibrium market price was 
unique and equal to the monopoly price, v. Since real-world retail 
markets are frequently characterized by a substantial degree of 
price variation, Diamond's "unique market price" conclusion posed 
a perplexing paradox. 
Motivated in part by the above paradox, several authors have 
constructed market models that exhibit price dispersion in 
equilibrium. I mention here a few of the important contributions. 
Considering models of monopolistic competition, Axell (1977). Salop 
and Stiglitz (1982), Albrecht and Axell (1984), and Rob (1985) 
obtain price dispersion when buyers differ in search costs; 
Diamond (1987) emphasizes the case wherein buyers have different 
valuations of the good; while Reinganum (1979) explores a setup in 
which firms have different production costs. In models of 
non-sequential search, Butters (1 977). Salop and Stiglitz (1 977). 
and Burdett and Judd (1983) demonstrate that price dispersion 
emerges when buyers differ ex post in the number of price offers 
received. Finally, Shilony (1977) and Varian (1980) analyze models 
of oligopoly and identify price dispersion with the mixed strategy 
pricing behavior of firms. 
In this note, I explore yet another aspect of the Diamond (1971) 
model; specifically, I consider the issue of market entry by buyers. 
Assume first that in order to participate in a Diamond-style goods 
market, prospective buyers are charged a small but positive entry 
fee. Since the equilibrium market price extracts all the consumer 
surplus from entering buyers, no one finds it worthwhile to pay the 
entry fee. In sum, with a positive entry fee, trading in the goods 
market ceases. 
TO study the non-trivial implncations of buyer entry, certain 
modifications in the Diamond (1971) structure are clearly required. 
I examine a model that differs from Diamond's setup in two 
essential ways. First, I assume that there is heterogeneity in the 
buyer pool with respect to the magnitude of the entry fee. 
Furthermore, for some buyers (e.g., teenagers in a shopping mall or 
hagglers in a bazaar), the entry fee is posited to be negative. 
Second, I impose heterogeneity in the buyer pool with respect to 
the gross valuation of the good. 
My model generates two intereshng propositions. First, I establish 
the existence of an equilibrium uith the following property: some 
buyers, though subjected to a strictly positive entry fee, nonetheless 
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enter the goods market to purchase the commodity. What is the 
intuition for this result? Notice that buyers with negative entry fees 
enter the goods market regardless of the ensuing market price. It 
turns out that the guaranteed entry of such buyers forces the 
market price to settle at a level that permits some buyers with 
positive entry fees to trade as well. Second, the model inevitably 
generates multiple equilibrium prices. The multiple equilibria can be 
ranked in terms of aggregate welfare: the trade volume and 
aggregate welfare decrease as the equilibrium price is raised. 
The rest of this note is structured as follows. In section 11, I 
describe the search model and analyze its equilibrium. In section 
111, I conclude by discussing the implications of the model's 
solution. 
11. The Search Model 
I consider a market for a homogeneous commodity with agents of 
two sorts: buyers, the potential demanders of the good, and firms, 
the suppliers of the good. Time is measured in discrete intervals 
and the horizon is infinite. 
A. Buyer Attributes 
In generic period t ,  buyers of unit measure are born. A buyer 
survives for two periods; thus, birth in period t leads to death at 
the conclusion of period ( t  + 1). 
After birth, each generation-t buyer decides whether to enter the 
period-t goods market. Should a buyer opt to enter, she is 
subjected to an entry fee, denoted by c. In each generation, a fixed 
proportion p ~ ( 0 ,  1) of buyers have c-values that are negative. Such 
buyers receive positive benefits from market participation per se. 
For the remaining buyers. of proportion (1 p ) ,  a more conventional 
assumption is invoked. Their c-values are represented by a 
cumulative probability distribution function F(c) with density f(c) > O  
defined on the interval [0, C] (F (0) = 0 and F(C) - 1). 
Upon entering the goods market, a generation t buyer has the 
option to purchase one unit of the commodity in either period t or 
period ( t+ 1). Consumption of the commodity yields an instan- 
taneous benefit, denoted by v. Different buyers have different 
v-values. In each generation of buyers, the v-values are represented 
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by a cumulative probability distribution function G(u) with density 
g(v) > O  defined on the interval [0, C] (G(O)-O and G(C)= 1). For 
analytical tractability, c and v are assumed to be independent 
random variables. 
Consider a buyer born in period t. Associated with this buyer is 
her pair of attributes (c, v). Four cases need to be reviewed. First, 
should the buyer opt for non-entry in the period-t goods market, 
her net payoff is 0. Second, if the buyer enters the period-t goods 
market and purchases the commodity in period t at price p,, her 
net payoff is (u--pl-c). Third, if the buyer enters the period-t goods 
market and purchases the commodity in period (t-- 1) at price pt+l, 
her net payoff is [ 6 x  (v-pt+l)  c], where 6E(O, 1) is the discount 
factor common to all buyers. Fourth, should the buyer enter the 
period-t goods market and exit without purchase, her net payoff is 
c. I 
B. Firm Attributes 
I abstract from firms' entry decisions and simply assume that 
there are m infinitely-lived firms in the goods market. As it turns 
out, this is an innocuous assumption because the set of 
equilibrium prices in the goods market is independent of m.2 Given 
the independence property, the process by which rn is determined 
can obviously be left unspecified.3 
' My treatment of buyer payoffs merits scrutiny. I have in effect assumed 
that the only explicit search cost is the discounting of utility from 
purchases made one period later. This approach to modeling search cost is 
of course pervasive in the literature (see. e.g., Diamond (1987). Rubinstein 
and Wolinsky (1985), and the exhaustive survey on labor market 
search-theoretic models by Rogerson et a/. (2005)). Furthermore, the results 
in this note are unchanged if search cost is modeled instead by allowing 
buyers to sample up to two prices sequentially a t  a fixed cost per 
observation. 
'To see the independence property clearly, refer to Equation (7). Equation 
(7) gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for a price, p, to be an 
equilibrium. Notice that rn does not feature in Equation (7). 
"t is also not difficult to suges t  ways of making rn endogenous. Given 
Equation (7). one can select an equilibrium price, p. This done, let n(p7 
denote the per period profit that firms earn in aggregate when the market 
price is p in each period t. If a firm incurs a fixed cost c, to enter the 
goods market, then free entry ensures that rn is given by the following 
equation: rnxcf=(l / ( l -  6))17(p7, where S r ( 0 ,  1) is the discount factor 
common to all firms. 
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Consider the actions of firm i in period t. At the start of period t ,  
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, finn i sets a period-t price, denoted 
by pit. Thereafter, by a process to be described shortly, buyers are 
assigned to firm i. Given pit, each assigned buyer decides whether 
to procure the good from firm i: firm i's period-t demand equals the 
number of purchasing buyers. [ assume, as is standard in the 
search literature, that firm i can instantaneously produce the 
quantity required to meet its period-t demand (capacity constraints 
are therefore ruled out) and strictly for notational ease, set firm i's 
(constant) marginal cost of production to 0.4 
In setting price pit, firm i's objective is to maximize its discounted 
profit stream. I shall impose assumptions to ensure that firm i's 
dynamic problem reduces to a static one. 
C. Matching of Consumers to Firms 
At the start of period t ,  buyers in the goods market are of two 
kinds. In the first category are buyers born in period ( t  1) who 
entered the goods market in period (t-  l ) ,  rejected the price offered 
in period (t- 1). but decided nonetheless to sample the period-t 
price. In the second category are buyers born in period t who enter 
the period-t goods market. In period t ,  each buyer (from both the 
above categories) is randomly assigned to one of the rn firms in the 
goods market. Since a firm's allotment of buyers is independent of 
its price history, the optimally chosen pit maximizes firm i's profit 
in period t .  
D. Entry of Consumers 
I shall restrict attention to equilibria wherein: 
Thus, in equilibrium, a time- and firm-independent price prevails in 
the goods market. All buyers correctly anticipate p. Hence, a 
generation-t buyer enters the goods market if her (c, v)-pair satisfies 
1) c<O, or 2) c 2 0  and (v - p  -c)>0.5.6 
'Notice, therefore, that if q,,  is finn i's period-t demand corresponding to 
the period-t price pit, firm i's cost of production in period t is 0 and its 
profit in period t is p,[xq,,. 
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E. Another Equilibrium Restriction 
Consider a generation-t buyer with the following two character- 
istics: c<O and v < p .  Since c <  0,  the buyer enters the period-t 
goods market. Since v < p ,  the buyer does not procure the 
commodity in period t or period ( t t  1). I shall restrict attention to 
equilibria wherein such a buyer exits the goods market after one 
round of search (that is, at the conclusion of period t) with a 
time-invariant probability of (1 - z) t 10. 11.7 
F. Aggregate Demand at an Exo!genously Fixed Price 
Finally, to understand how the model functions, consider the 
following hypothetical situation. Suppose all firms are forced to 
charge an exogenously given price p in every period 1 ;  that is, 
pet-p, Vi, t .  Suppose, also, that buyers realize that sellers set 
pit=p. di, t.8 What, then, is the period-t aggregate demand at price 
P? 
Notice that since in equilibrium, pic -p, V i, t ,  discouriting ensures that 
generation-t buyers who enter the goods market to purchase the commodity 
actually make the purchase in period t itself. For such buyers, there is no 
equilibrium search. But, this admittedly awkward "no equilibrium search" 
result crops up in several well known models in the search-theoretic 
literature. Indeed, costly search is obviously ruled out in any model where 
the price of the traded good has a degenerate distribution (see, e.g., 
Diamond (19711 and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985)). 
'1t should be clear by now that this note studies search issues in an 
overlapping generations framework. Why is such a framework used? Fix a 
set of buyers that enter the goods market, howsoever modeled. At least 
some buyers in this set will eventuall!~ trade and exit the goods market. To 
obtain a steady-state equilibrium price, p,,-p, V i ,  t, the exiting set of 
buyers must be replaced by new entrants. Exit and fresh entry fit naturally 
in an overlapping generations framework. 
7Two observations are relevant here. First, a generation t buyer with cd  0 
and v<p is indifferent between exiting the goods market a t  the conclusion 
of period t (one round of search) and exiting the goocls market a t  the 
conclusion of period (tt lJ (two rounds of search). Given indifference, exiting 
with probability (1 n )  after one rountl of search is opti ial  for the buyer. 
Second, note that n is an endogenous variable and not a fixed parameter. 
Furthermore, given the buyer's indifference between "further search" and 
"exit," n can be pegged a t  any value in the interval 10. I] .  Indeed, in the 
proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, I will choose n to lie in a specific 
subinterval of [O. 11. 
'Note that the exogenously given ,o is not necessarily the equilibrium 
price in the market, p. 
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Consider how many generati0n.A buyers purchase the commodity 
at price p. First, a proporti011 p of generation-t buyers have 
c-values that are negative. These buyers enter the period-t goods 
market and purchase the commodity immediately (that is, in period 
t) if gross valuation, v, weakly exceeds p. Hence, aggregate demand 
from such buyers equals [px (1 - C;(p))]. 
Second, a proportion (1-p) of generation-t buyers have non- 
negative c-values. For this group, a buyer with (c, &pair such that 
(v- p --- c) 2 0  enters the period-t goods market and purchases the 
commodity immediately (that is, in period t ) .  Hence, aggregate 
demand from such buyers equals [(I-p]x JbC flu-p)dG(v)]. 
Third, observe that in period t, the generation-(t 1) buyers still 
in the market are those with c'<O and u<p.  Such buyers do not 
contribute to the period-t aggregate demand at price p. hl  sum, the 
period-t aggregate demand at price p, denoted D(p). is: 
Given the search model that. I have described, Proposition 1 
establishes the existence of an equilibrium market price, p, in the 
open interval (0, C). Since p<C,  notice that a buyer with a (c, u)- 
pair such that c>O and (v-p-c) 2 0  enters the goods market and 
purchases the commodity. The upshot of all this is as follows: 
some buyers with strictly positive entry fees choose nonetheless to 
trade in the goods market. 
Proposition 1 
For the goods market, the existence of a time- and firm- 
independent equilibrium price in the open interval (0, C) is 
guaranteed. 
Proof: The solution consists of two parts. Given a putative 
equilibrium price p, I first ensure that it is unprofitable for firm i 
in period t to raise its price from p to ( p f ~ ) .  Thereafter, I verify 
that it is also unprofitable for firm i in period t to lower its price 
from p to (p- E ) .  
Raising price to (P + E). Suppose firm i charges a price of (p  + E ) .  I 
evaluate the firm's period-t demand, denoted D,(p--6). in two steps. 
First, all generation-(t 1) buyers assigned to firm i in period t have 
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gross valuations, v, less than p. Hence, they do riot contribute to 
demand Di(p+&). Second, a generation-t buyer assigned to firm i in 
period t behaves a s  follows: 1) if gross valuation, u, is such that 
(v-p-~)26x(u-j5), the buyer purchases the good from firm i; 
otherwise 2) the buyer exits firm i and purchases the good in 
period (t+ 1) at the putative equilibrium price of p. 
I now compute the number of generation-t buyers assigned to 
firm i in period t with v-values satisfying ( v - ~ - E ) >  Sx(v--fl - that 
is, v 2 k= [ p+ (E/ (1 - S))]. Two distinct situations arise. First, a mass 
(p/m) of generation-t buyers with firm i have negative c-values. Of 
these buyers, a proportion equal to (1 - G(k)) have gross valuations 
weakly exceeding k. Second, generation-t buyers of mass (1-p) 
have c-values that are non-negative. Since p is the conjectured 
market price, the proportion of such buyers that 1) enter the 
period-t goods market and 2) have gross valuations weakly 
exceeding k equals [ J': F(v -ad G(v)] . Given the random matching 
process. firm i obtains a ( l /m)  share of all entering buyers. Thus, 
D , ( ~ + E ]  is: 
When firm i sets a price of (P+E), its period-t profit. denoted 
Ri(p+ E), is (p+ &)xDi(p+&). If "market price of p" is an equilibrium, 
Ri(.) must decline for local increases of price relative to p. This is 
equivalent to the following condition:g 
Lowering price to ( p - E ) .  Suppose firm i charges a price of 
(j5 - E ) .  I evaluate firm i's period-t demand, denoted D,(p- E) ,  in two 
steps. First, firm i is assigned generation-(t- 1) buyers of mass 
((pxmG(p7)/rn). All such buyers have gross valuations v less than p 
(otherwise, purchase and exit would have occurred in period 
1 will assume that the second-order condition for profit maximization is 
satisfied. The second-order condition is satisfied if 1) g'(vlr0, or 2) g(v)> 
([g'(u) 1 /(lP8)). Note that if the u-values are uniformly distributed among 
buyers, then gZ(u) -0. Hence, in this case both conditions 1 and 2 hold. 
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(t-1) itself). The proportion of such buyers with u€[p--6,  a is 
given by ([G(p3--G(p- E)]/(G(@).  Since these buyers procure the good 
from firm i at the reduced price (p- E) ,  their contribution to Di(@- E) 
equals (Ipx m IG(p7 - G(F - 41) / rn) . 
Consider the behavior of a generation-t buyer assigned to firm i 
in period t. The buyer purchases the good from finn i if and only if 
her gross valuation v weakly exceeds (@-6) .  How many such 
buyers arrive? First, a mass (plrn) of generation-t buyers with firm 
i have c-values that are negati~re. Of these buyers, a proportion 
equal to 11 - G(p- E ) ]  have gross valuations weakly exceeding (p E ) .  
Second, a mass ( 1  - p )  of generation-t buyers have non-negative 
c-values. Since p is the conjectured market price, the proportion of 
such buyers that 1) enter the period-t goods market and 2) have 
gross valuations weakly exceeding (p- E) equals I F(LI -fldG(v)]. 
Given the random matching process, firm i receives its ( l / rn)  share 
of all entering buyers. Thus, Di(@- E )  is as follows: 
When firm i sets a price of (p-E) ,  its period-t profit, denoted 
Ri(P- 6). is (p- E ) x D ~ ( ~  - E ) .  If "market price of j7' is an equilibrium, 
Ri(.) must decline for local decreases of price relative to ji. This is 
equivalent to the following condition:lo 
Using Equations (4) and (6) .  a price of p can be sustained in 
equilibrium if and only if the corresponding aggregate demand (refer 
to Equation (2)  for the expression1 satisfies the following condition: 
10 1 will assume that the second-orcler condition for profit maximization is 
satisfied. The second-order condition is satisfied if 1) g ' ( u I s 0 ,  or 2 )  g ( o l 2  
( (  lg'(v) 1 xu)/2). Note that if the u-values are uniformly distributed among 
buyers, then g'(u)=O. Hence, in this c,ase both conditions 1 and 2 hold. 
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I have assumed that g(.) is a continuous function and strictly 
positive on the interval [0, C]. Furthermore, it is easy to show that 
D(0) strictly exceeds 0 and 0 =D(C) < [Cxg(C) xpx (1 + x)]. Since D(.) is 
a continuous function, the Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees 
that the set SL= [p l D(pl= [pxg(p)x,m(l+ n)l, p t  (0, CIJ is non-empty. 
Given that x t (0, 11 is arbitrary, I shall choose 7-c such that (1 + ;n) 
is strictly less than (1/(lPS)).  As a result, any element of SL 
satisfies Equation (7). In sum, I have proved the existence of a 
steady-state equilibrium price in tlle open interval (0, C). rn 
In this note, the assumptions are few in number and not 
unreasonable. Yet, somewhat unexpectedly, Proposition 2 points out 
that the goods market must have multiple equilibrium prices. 
Notice also that this multiple equilibrium result obtains without 
placing restrictions on parameter values (e.g., 6 is any number in 
the open interval (0, 1)) or choosing specific functional forms (e.g., 
g(.) is any positive density function on the interval [O, C]). 
Proposition 2 
For the goods market, there exist multiple time- and firm- 
independent equilibrium prices.11 
Pro03 Note that D(0) strictly exceeds 0 whereas 0-D(C)< 
((Cxg(C) xp) / (1 - 6)). Therefore, the Intermediate Value Theorem 
guarantees that the set SRE [p I D(p) = ((pxg(p)xp)/(l-6)). p t  (0, C)] is 
non-empty. Furthermore, for n t [ ( 3 ,  11 chosen such that ( l + ; n )  is 
strictly less than ( l / ( l  -8)). it i:; clear that any element of SR 
constitutes a steady-state equilibrium price. Observe, finally, that SL 
and SR are disjoint sets. Hence, I have proved the existence of 
multiple steady-state equilibrium prices. 
11 I have only endeavored to establish the existence of' multiple 
steady-state equilibria. In many cases (e.g. ,  when J.) and g( . )  are densities 
corresponding to the uniform distribution), there is a continuum of 
steady-state equilibrium prices. I have not emphasized this aspect since it 
is tangential to the main thrust of this note. 
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111. Conclusion 
In this note, I have modified slightly the well-known goods 
market model of Diamond (1971). The modified model yields two 
new results. First, I establish the existence of an equilibrium in 
which some buyers, though sul~jected to a strictly positive entry 
fee, nonetheless choose to enter the goods market and purchase 
the commodity. Second, the goods market inevitably generates 
multiple equilibrium prices. 
The model that I have constructed hinges on two critical 
assumptions that merit further scrutiny. First, I have introduced 
heterogeneity among prospective buyers with respect to gross 
valuations, v. Suppose, instead, that all prospective buyers share a 
common gross valuation, v,. Standard arguments establish that the 
unique equilibrium market price in this case is also v,. Thus, only 
buyers with negative c-values enter the goods market and purchase 
the commodity. In other words, without heterogeneity in gross 
valuations, my model collapses to that of Diamond (1971). 
Second, I have maintained that a strictly positive fraction, p, of 
prospective buyers have negative entry fees. Suppose, instead, that 
p=O. In this case, the goods market 'simply shuts down. W h v  
Assume, to the contrary, that the goods market allows some 
trading in equilibrium and that the equilibrium market price is 
therefore p <  C. Since all buyers correctly anticipate p, those 
entering the goods market have gross valuations, v, weakly 
exceeding p. But, when the lowest u-type in the market is fixed at 
p, firm i's profit increases should it deviate unilaterally and set a 
price slightly higher than p.12 This, in turn, contradicts the premise 
that p is an equilibrium market price to begin with. 
I now focus on a particular equilibrium market price, p. 
Exclusively because of the search environment (note the absence of 
strategic interactions in my model), each firm's demand curve has a 
kink at p. Why? Suppose firm i in period t raises its price from p 
to (P+E). Then it loses generation-t buyers assigned to it with gross 
12 TO see that such a deviation is profitable for firm i, refer to Equation (4). 
Recall that if the inequality in Equation (4) is violated, a small increase in 
price from the putative equilibrium price of p is profitable for firm i. But, 
given p=0, the right-hand side of Equation (4) is 0. On the other hand, the 
left-hand side of Equation (4) is [(l/rrd I; f l u  @dG(v)] >0  So, the inequality 
in Equation (4) is violated when ,u is set to 0. 
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valuations v satisfylng Sx(v j5) > (v P-E). Such buyers respond to 
the price hike by searching for one more period; the good is 
purchased in period (t+ 1) at price p. Note that firm i's demand 
loss is increasing in 6. Now, suppose firm i in period t lowers its 
price from j? to (P-E). Given the structure of my model, the lower 
price does not induce additional search from prospective buyers 
assigned to other firms. Firm i's increase in demand comes from 
generation-(-1) buyers assigned to it in period t with gross 
valuations v satisfylng v>(p--E). Clearly, firm i's demand increase is 
increasing in n the time-invariant probability with which 
generation-(t 1) buyers remain in the period-t goods market. When 
(1 + n) < (l/(l -6)) (refer to Equation (711, the elasticity of demand 
with respect to a price increase relative to p exceeds the elasticity 
of demand with respect to a price decrease relative to p.13 
The central result of this note is the multiplicity of equilibrium 
market prices. In other words, the location of the kink in a firm's 
demand curve is indeterminate. What accounts for this in- 
determinacy? When prospective buyers conjecture a low market 
price, even those with low gross valuations enter the goods market. 
Given the resulting distribution of gross valuations in the goods 
market, individual firms find it optimal to charge a low price, 
thereby validating buyers' inibal beliefs. By contrast, when 
prospective buyers predict a high market price, only those 
possessing high gross valuations enter the goods market. With 
high-type buyers populating the goods market, individual firms 
discover that charging a high price maximizes private profits. 
Hence, firms' pricing behavior matches buyers' forecasts. 
The multiplicity of equilibrium market prices has an interesting 
implication. Following convention, I measure aggregate welfare as 
the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Given the structure of 
the model, it is immediate that aggregate welfare increases as the 
volume of sales rises. Thus, the model's multiple equilibria are 
ranked in terms of aggregate welfare: aggregate welfare decreases as 
the equilibrium price is raised. 
13 Stiglitz (1987) also uses a search environment to show that a firm's 
demand curve may have a kink at the market price. My model, which is 
undoubtedly less involved, differs from Stiglitz (1987) in several ways- 
Stiglitz's buyers demand x(p) units of the good at price p: when a firm 
changes its price from the putative equilibrium. the altered price 
distribution is immediately known to all prospective buyers; and so on. 
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